The so-called rule in Re Hastings-Bass has developed rapidly in the courts
in trustee decision-making, the apotheosis of which is found in Gisborne v Gisborne.
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The foundations of the 'rule'
The first model, which will be referred to as the 'weak' rule, says that the rule in Re Hastings-Bass is a rule governing decision-making by trustees. When trustees decide to exercise a power or discretion vested in them, or decide in what manner to exercise it, they have an obligation to consider the appropriateness of the exercise. To satisfy this obligation they must take into account matters relevant to their decision, and must exclude from consideration irrelevant matters. In determining what matters are relevant, and what weight to attribute to each such matter, the trustees must act responsibly. Accordingly, a matter is only treated as legally 'relevant' if a responsible trustee would have taken it into account. A breach of this duty to consider is a breach of trust which will invalidate the purported exercise of the power. The can be viewed simply as an aspect of the beneficiaries' entitlement to proper performance of the trusts. 9 Beneficiaries are often peculiarly vulnerable in their relationship with their trustees. 10 As such, it is proper for the law to require trustees to act with integrity and responsibility. The beneficiaries have no entitlement to a particular outcome, but they are entitled to proper conduct on the part of their trustees.
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When trustees decide to exercise a power or discretion vested in them, or decide in what manner to exercise it, they have an obligation to consider the appropriateness ofthe exercise
Beneficiaries are often peculiarly vulnerable in their relationship with their trustees
It is proper for the law to require trustees to act with integrity and responsibility. The beneficiaries have no entitlement to a particular outcome, but they are entitled to proper conduct on the part oftheir trustees
We must be careful as well to differentiate a variant of the 'weak' rule, which will be called the 'unlimited weak' rule. This is simply the 'weak' rule without the limit on relevance imposed by the 'responsible trustee' requirement. That is, it would allow the Re Hastings-Bass rule to vitiate any exercise of a power where the trustee failed to take a factually relevant matter into account, no matter the reason for that failure.
The second model will be referred to as the 'strong' rule. This version of the rule is concerned with whether the trustees' actions achieve their intended outcome. So according to the 'strong' rule, if trustees purport to exercise a power with a view to achieving a particular outcome, and that outcome is not achieved, the purported exercise of the power is invalid. No breach of trust on the part of the trustee is necessary or sufficient to invoke the rule. A variant of the 'strong' rule is to put the rule in terms of an obligation to take into account relevant considerations, whilst mandating the true effect of the exercise of the power as a relevant consideration. 12 This produces exactly the same effect as the strong rule: if the outcome was unforeseen then it was not considered, and the purported exercise of the power is invalid. 
The Re Hastings-Bass cases
The 'weak' rule is clearly to be seen in many of the Re Hastings-Bass cases. However, given the ambiguity of many of the cases, which do not expressly consider the distinction between the 'weak' and 'strong' formulations, it is not sufficient simply to draw general conclusions. What is required instead is a detailed analysis of the case law. Of the two dozen or so reported cases in which Re Hastings-Bass is mentioned in at least one judgment, five in particular provide the basis for the 'weak' approach.
13

Mettoy PensionTrustees Ltd v Evans
Mettoy 14 concerned the purported exercise by the trustees of a pension scheme of an express power of amendment contained in the scheme rules. The exercise of that power of amendment in 1983 changed, among other things, the rule governing the winding up of the scheme. When the scheme was in fact wound up, an issue arose as to whether the exercise of the power of amendment was valid, and therefore whether the scheme's assets were to be dealt with according to the old rules or the new rules. 15 The difficulty arose because none of the trustees who agreed to the 1983 amendment had read and understood the effects of the deed of amendment. They had relied instead on a summary provided by the scheme's solicitor. 16 Warner J expressed the Re Hastings-Bass rule issue here in purely 'weak' rule terms, saying that Re Hastings-Bass mandates that:
where a trustee acts under a discretion given to him by the terms of the trust, the court will interfere with his action if it is clear that he would not have acted as he did had he not failed to take into account considerations which he ought to have taken into account.
17
He consequently put the test for applying the rule in 'weak' terms too:
(1) What were the trustees under a duty to consider? (2) Did they fail to consider it? (3) If so, what would they have done if they had considered it? 18 Applying this test, Warner J held that the trustees were under a duty, in deciding to exercise the power of amendment to implement new scheme rules, to consider what those new rules were, and that they had failed in this duty. 19 However, Warner J also held under limb (3) of his test that the trustees, had they fully understood the new rules, would have exercised the power of amendment to implement them nevertheless. 20 Mettoy works perfectly well as a 'weak' rule case. A responsible trustee would not exercise a power of amendment without at least reading the proposed amendments, and seeking clarification where they were not straightforward to understand. Accordingly the trustees breached their duty, and the exercise of the power is saved from invalidity only by the exception in (3), which might be characterized as primarily pragmatic-the court will not intervene when in spite of the deficiency in decision-making, no negative consequences for the beneficiaries have ensued. To make this work as a 'strong' rule case, we would have to say that the trustees did not achieve the result they intended. But since it is absolutely clear that they intended to amend the scheme rules in accordance with the deed of amendment, it is difficult to find any mismatch between intention and outcome. Accordingly, if the 'strong' rule were correct, If trustees, in exercise of one of their express powers, take an action which on the face of it falls within the letter of the power, the action may nevertheless be held to have been ineffective if (1) the trustees fail to take into account something which they ought to have taken into account; or (2) the trustees take into account something which they ought not to have taken into account . . .
24
More important were his reasons for rejecting the challenge to the 1976 appointment. An issue arose as to whether the 1976 appointment fell within the scope of paragraph 15 of schedule 5 to the 1975 Finance Act, which conferred privileged treatment for capital transfer tax purposes. 25 It had always been assumed that the 1976 appointment was within the scope of paragraph 15, and in light of the new argument that in fact it was not, it was further argued that the appointment was invalid on Re Hastings-Bass grounds, since had the trustees realized that the appointment would not be within paragraph 15, they would not have so exercised the power.
26
Park J rejected this on the basis that whilst this argument might be seen now to have had some technical force . . . it had no merits of a more general nature.
It was certainly abstruse and recondite.
27
Neither the trustees' advisors nor the Revenue appreciated the problem, and 22 years had passed without the issue being raised, during which time all had relied on the validity of the appointment.
28
This must be an application of the 'weak' rule. A responsible trustee cannot be criticized for failing to appreciate the relevance of 'abstruse and recondite' matters and consequently for failing to take them into account. There is no breach of the duty to consider, and no application for the Re Hastings-Bass rule. Whereas applying the 'strong' rule, there is no 21. Apart from the application of the pragmatic exception. Articlesreal doubt that the trustees failed to understand the true legal consequences of their actions when they executed the 1976 appointment; they intended to make an appointment which would attract the privileged treatment of paragraph 15, and failed to do so. Calling the argument 'abstruse and recondite' does not affect the conclusion that the legal effect of their decision was not what they expected or intended it to be. On the 'strong' approach the Re Hastings-Bass rule would invalidate this decision and this aspect of Breadner would have to be considered wrongly decided.
Green v Cobham
A responsible trustee cannot be criticized for failing to appreciate the relevance of 'abstruse and recondite' matters and consequently for failing to take them into account
AbacusTrust Co (Isle of Man) Ltd v Barr
Breadner was followed by Abacus Trust Co (Isle of Man) Ltd v Barr, 29 perhaps the leading case on the 'weak' rule. An agent acting for the trustee misunderstood the settlor's wishes as regards the exercise of an overriding power of appointment by the trustee, with the result that the trustee received incorrect information about those wishes. This caused the trustee to exercise the power so that 60 per cent of the fund was appointed on trusts for the settlor's sons, rather than 40 per cent as the settlor wished. 30 The mistake was discovered within a few months, but no action was taken until almost a decade later. 31 In analysing 
Gallaher Ltd v Gallaher Pensions Ltd
The lead given by Lightman J in Barr was followed by Etherton J in Gallaher Ltd v Gallaher Pensions Ltd.
44
The case concerned a pension scheme of which Gallaher Pensions Ltd (GPL) was trustee. GPL exercised an express power of amendment contained in the scheme rules to change the scheme to augment pensions. GPL meant to increase by 2 per cent (or the Retail Price Index (RPI) at that time, if lower) only that part of the pensions in excess of the guaranteed minimum pension, 45 but the words used in the deed of amendment were wide enough to increase the whole pension by 2 per cent or RPI, which would be a much more significant burden for the fund to bear. 46 Articlesthe resolutions gave proper effect to the intention not to change the previous policy. 55 So the trustee did not simply fail to understand the true legal consequences of its action. Rather, it failed to take adequate steps to inform itself of what the documents said. On the 'strong' view this would not matter-it would be enough to show that the result intended by the trustee was not achieved by its action. The consideration of the trustee's failure to inform itself adequately as to the content of the relevant documents shows the weak rule in action. The distinction here may appear to be a fine one. Under the weak rule, a trustee who acts responsibly to ensure that he understands the action he is proposing to take does not commit a breach of duty if the consequences of the action are unexpected, and that action is therefore not invalidated on Re Hastings-Bass grounds. There is no relevant matter that he has failed to take into account. Whereas a trustee who simply fails to inform himself of the content of the document before signing has failed to take into account the content of the document, which is manifestly a relevant consideration. 56 Whilst the distinction is a fine one, it fits perfectly with the underlying view that the 'weak' Re Hastings-Bass rule is about the beneficiaries' entitlement to responsible behaviour by their trustees. 57 If a trustee misunderstands a legal document, he does not necessarily thereby act irresponsibly. But it is irresponsible to fail to take simple steps to ensure that the document matches his intentions, and the beneficiaries are in that case entitled to the protection of the rule. 'strong' approaches to the rule, this was a case where the trustees did not achieve the result they intendedthe 1992 'definitive deed' did not have the intended effects. So on the strong view the trustees should succeed. But it is clear that the reason that they do not is that the the trustees had not breached any duty owed to the beneficiaries, the scheme members. The scheme members suffered no disadvantage-there was not even any question of the employer being unable to afford the increased contributions it would have to make to fund the early retirement pensions 66 -and were entitled to say, as against the trustees, that they were happy with the scheme as it was. Park J can therefore be seen to make a firm choice of the 'weak' rule, which in the light of his judgment in Breadner 67 and his concern there to keep Hastings-Bass within reasonable bounds 68 is perhaps unsurprising.
Smithson v Hamilton
McPhail v Doulton: the duties of trustees exercising powers and discretions
From this review of the principal 'weak' rule cases it is apparent that the 'weak' rule is a good fit with much of the case law, and that some of the cases are explicable only on the 'weak' rule basis. 69 But there are also important arguments in favour of the 'weak' rule to be found outside of the Re Hastings-Bass cases.
In the 1970s and 1980s it fell to the courts, and especially the House of Lords, to determine the tests which govern the validity of discretionary trusts and powers of appointment vested in trustees. From this body of case law, not traditionally associated with the rule in Re Hastings-Bass, can be discerned three principles which provide support for the 'weak' approach. First, the courts' analyses of the duties of a trustee holding a power of appointment expressly identify a duty to consider when and how to exercise the power. This duty to consider forms the true doctrinal basis of the Re Hastings-Bass rule, and mandates a 'weak' approach focused on responsible consideration. Secondly, the scope of the duty to consider must be limited to responsible consideration, rather than consideration of all factually relevant matters, since it would otherwise conflict with authoritative statements as to the limits of the trustees' duties. Thirdly, only the 'weak' Re Hastings-Bass rule is compatible with the courts' view of the nature of the 'control' that the court must be able to exercise over trustees.
The scope ofthe duty to consider must be limited to responsible consideration, rather than consideration of all factuallyrelevant matters Only the 'weak' Re Hastings-Bass rule is compatible with the courts' view of the nature of the 'control' that the court must be able to exercise over trustees the trustee must, first, consider periodically whether or not he should exercise the power; second, consider the range of objects of the power; and third, consider the appropriateness of individual appointments.
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This statement was adopted by Mervyn Davies J in Turner v Turner, 76 where the trustees exercised a power of appointment without directing their minds to consider at all the nature of what they were doing. The judge held that the trustees were obliged to ' ''consider'' before appointing' and did not, and that accordingly the appointments would be set aside. 77 In essence, the case law requires a trustee holding a power of appointment to consider responsibly both whether and how to exercise it. This is a perfect fit for the 'weak' conception of the Re Hastings-Bass rule, which requires trustees to act responsibly in exercising powers by taking into account matters which would appear to a responsible trustee to be relevant. The natural doctrinal home of the 'weak' Re Hastings-Bass rule is in the trustee's duty responsibly to consider exercising, and how to exercise, a power. This duty to consider exercising the power is at the heart of the case law on the validity of discretionary trusts and powers. If the Re Hastings-Bass rule is not grounded in the breach by a trustee of the duty to consider, then it does not appear that the duty to consider has any practical effect
The restriction of the weak view to a duty of 'responsible consideration', rather than consideration of every conceivably relevant matter, is also mandated by this line of cases. In McPhail Lord Wilberforce makes clear that the trustee of a discretionary trust would not be required to consider every possible object of the discretion. 83 Given the effective assimilation of discretionary trusts and powers held by trustees in McPhail It would be surprising if this were not also true of the duty to consider in relation to a power of appointment held by a trustee. If the weak view of Re Hastings-Bass were adopted without any limitation on the obligation to take relevant matters into account, it would be possible for a beneficiary to have the exercise of a power of appointment by a trustee set aside on the basis that some characteristic of a particular object was factually relevant. For example, a beneficiary might argue that the trustees acted on the basis that no object of the power was in particular financial need, having considered the circumstances of those objects close to hand. If they could show that some remoter object did have such need, and that the policy or practice of the trustees was such that this would have been likely to affect their decision, then the exercise of the power could be set aside under the Re Hastings-Bass rule. But the consequences of such an approach to the 'weak' rule prove to be impermissible. On the view adopted here that the duty to consider the exercise of the power is the basis of the Re Hastings-Bass rule, and that it requires a breach of that duty, to allow the Re Hastings-Bass rule to be invoked in the circumstances described would be to imply that the trustees had breached their duty to consider the exercise of the power. The breach would consist in failing to take into account the financial situation of the remote object. As it is a maxim, that the execution of a trust shall be under the controul of the court, it must be of such a nature, that is can be under that controul; so that the administration of it can be renewed by the court. 83. Given the decision in McPhail that there is no requirement that the trustees should be able to make a 'complete list' of beneficiaries (McPhail v Doulton (n 7) 456) it would not in any case be practically possible where the trust was valid on the 'is or is not' test but no complete list could be made.
84. And the settlor would in all likelihood not expect that the trustees would consider every object: Y Grbich, 'Baden: Awakening the Conceptually Moribund Trust' (1974) 37 MLR 643, 647. Harris takes this further by arguing that the very existence of the duty to consider is based on the settlor's intention that the trustee should consider whether and how to exercise a power granted to him: Harris (n 81) 51-52.
85. See n 83. 86. McPhail v Doulton (n 7) 449.
87. The precise scope of the duty would depend upon the circumstances. It is likely that if the class of potential objects were small, then a responsible trustee would consider all of them (although there may still be factually relevant characteristics of these objects of which the responsible trustee would be unaware).
88. holders of powers are also subject to this requirement of control, although the extent of the control is necessarily more limited, since the court cannot order the exercise of the power (although it can replace the trustee, or order him to do his duty). 93 If the 'strong' approach to the Re Hastings-Bass rule were to be adopted, such that the exercise of a power could be invalidated by its unforeseen outcome, this would create serious difficulties for the court in exercising its supervision and control over the trustees. In particular, the trustees may wish to seek the court's approval for the exercise of a power of appointment in a particular fashion. 94 If the court approves the exercise of the power, then the trustee is protected from any challenge to his action in accordance with the court's approval. 95 But if the exercise of the power produced an unintended result, unforeseen by trustee or court, then on the 'strong' view of Re Hastings-Bass it is invalid. There is no authority on this precise situation, but the logical alternatives are either that the appointment is invalid, and therefore the court's approval (and therefore also the value of the process of trustees seeking the court's approval) is undermined; or, more likely, the appointment is valid because approved by the court, but the court is then in the position of having rendered valid an appointment which in the natural course of things ought to have been invalid. This outcome may satisfy the trustees in the instant case, but it distorts entirely the process of seeking the court's approval. The court cannot generally consent on behalf of beneficiaries to trustees acting outside their powers or in breach of their duties 96 and it will not knowingly permit the trustees to make an invalid exercise of a power.
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Rather, it determines how the trustees ought to act in order to comply with their duties. The difficulty therefore is that the 'strong' approach leaves the court with no way of properly exercising this jurisdiction to approve trustees' actions. Since there is no way to determine conclusively in advance of exercising a power whether it will produce the intended result, there is no way in which the court can rule out the possibility of invalidity based on matters which only become known afterwards. A similar approach can be taken to the 'unlimited weak' view, of requiring all factually relevant matters to be taken into account. If this were the case, it would be impossible for the court to know whether all such matters had been taken into account and accordingly whether approval ought to be denied. If the court is not able to give or withhold approval to the proposed exercise of a power by a trustee, because the Re Hastings-Bass rule makes the validity of the exercise highly unpredictable, then the court is not able adequately to supervise and control the performance by the trustee of his duties. Their discretion and authority, always supposing that there is no mala fides with regard to its exercise, is to be without any check or control from any superior tribunal.
102
Lord Penzance noted that whilst the trustees were required to support the testator's wife, it was for the trustees, and not the court, to decide how to achieve the prescribed end. 103 The conclusion that the courts will not interfere with the exercise of powers or discretions by trustees unless there is a problem with the decision-making process itself is confirmed by a long line of cases following Gisborne. In Re Beloved Wilkes.
104 Lord Truro LC held that since the settlor has put the execution of the trust in the hands of the trustees, not the court, the court will limit its supervision to the question of the honesty, integrity and fairness with which the deliberation has been conducted.
105
In Tabor v Brooks, 106 Sir Richard Malins V-C held that the court would intervene only in cases of mala fides; a discretion fairly and honestly exercised would not be impugned by the court. 107 This was a particularly strong case for the application of the Gisborne rule, since the trustees appeared to be acting unfairly and unreasonably by paying the available sum of £300 per annum to Mr Tabor, rather than splitting it between Mr and Mrs Tabor, apparently in order to pressure her to resume living with him, 108 even though the judge found that he was 'of such confirmed drunken habits as to justify his wife in not 110 What all have in common is the clear underlying principle that where a power or discretion has been conferred upon a trustee, the court will not interfere with its exercise in good faith by the trustee. As Cullity has convincingly argued, the Gisborne doctrine is not limited to powers expressed to be 'uncontrollable', 111 but rather is concerned with the express conferral of a discretion which permits the trustees to act without reference to rules or standards which would otherwise govern the exercise of the discretion. 112 In the context of a dispositive power, its very grant to trustees confers upon them a discretion to prefer the interests of the objects of the power to those of the default beneficiaries, and to prefer the interests of some objects to others. 113 This reflects an important distinction between allowing trustees to make a judgment and to make a choice. 114 Where the settlor confers on his trustees the authority to make choices, it is not for the court to deny the trustees' decisions.
Where a power or discretion has been conferred upon a trustee, the court will not interfere with its exercise in good faith by the trustee The same approach was taken by Lord Normand, who held that trustees' decisions could only be challenged where they acted unreasonably-and if they perform their duty 'carefully, seriously, and impartially' then they do not act unreasonably.
117
The statement of the Deputy Bailiff in Re Green GLG Trust may overestimate the significance of the Gisborne principle, since it has already been shown how the Re Hastings-Bass rule depends upon the trustees' duty to consider. But it also shows that it is easy to underestimate to importance of the Gisborne doctrine in the Re Hastings-Bass context. It follows from the foregoing discussion of Gisborne that the exercise by trustees of a power is only challengeable where the trustees 'did not act honestly or in good faith' 118 or where the 'honesty, integrity, and fairness' 119 of the decision-making is impugned. As such, it is difficult to see how many Re Hastings-Bass challenges could succeed, since in none of the cases are the trustees alleged to have acted in bad faith or dishonestly in making the challenged decision. The answer is that mala fides in this context has a wider meaning than simply dishonesty. Whilst dishonesty includes deliberately acting otherwise than in the beneficiaries' interests, 120 in the context of a dispositive power the trustees are entitled to prefer some beneficiaries over others. Accordingly their duty is to carry out the purpose for which the settlor conferred the power upon them 121 and they act dishonestly if they deliberately act contrary to this purpose. 122 But Cullity has argued for a still wider approach, which brings not only improper purposes, but also unreasonable decisionmaking and failure properly to consider within the scope of the mala fides exception.
123
Most important, given the explanation of the Hastings-Bass rule as premised on the duty of consideration, is the extent to which 'failure to consider' can constitute mala fides for this purpose. Cullity argues that where the donee of a power is a trustee, he must take into account all relevant matters which the donor might reasonably have expected the trustee to consider. 124 However, Cullity further notes the limitation previously described, that in the case of a discretionary trust or power with a large class of objects, the trustee will not be required to consider all of them. 125 The conclusion for the rule in Re Hastings-Bass is therefore that as long the trustee acts as described by Lord Normand and Lord Reid in Board of Management for Dundee General Hospitals 126 and responsibly considers whether and how to exercise a power, the exercise should be immune from challenge. A simple mistake, for instance, does not invalidate their decision-making.
127
What then of the various models of the Re Hastings-Bass rule? The 'weak' model, which requires trustees to consider responsibly when and how to exercise a power conferred on them, and which permits the exercise of a power to be invalidated only when such responsible consideration is lacking, is partly premised upon the Gisborne doctrine, and is a perfect fit with its concerns. Since the mala fides exception to Gisborne extends to failure to consider only in so far as the trustees fail to consider matters which the settlor could reasonably have expected them to consider, 128 it is clear that the 'unlimited' weak approach is impermissible. It would allow the court to interfere with the exercise of a power on the basis that the trustees failed to take into account factually relevant matters even though the trustees acted honestly and fairly, and that on the view proposed by Cullity and adopted here, this failure would not amount to mala fides. Thus to invalidate the exercise of a power on this basis would be contrary to the doctrine in Gisborne and Dundee Hospitals. The same analysis applies a fortiori to the 'strong' approach. If the trustees' decision can be retrospectively invalidated because, although it was made with all possible propriety and responsibility and with no failure to consider relevant matters, it produced an unintended result, then the Gisborne doctrine is wholly denied, since no question of mala fides Gisborne, 132 it might be legitimate simply to treat these cases as wrongly decided, it is more useful to understand why they were decided as they were and whether, in spite of their apparent support for the 'strong' rule, they can properly be analysed as 'weak' rule decisions.
Re Hastings-Bass and Re Abrahams' Will Trusts
Both of these cases could be seen as supporting the 'strong' rule, because on their face each is concerned with whether the trustees' actions-purported exercises of the statutory power of advancement 133 -brought about the outcome intended by the trustees. 134 If they did not, the purported advancements would be invalid.
135
But correctly understood these cases are not really cases on the Re Hastings-Bass rule at all-which is therefore entirely inaptly named. Rather, Re Hastings-Bass simply decided: first, that an exercise of the power of advancement is ultra vires section 32 of the Trustee Act 1925 if the trustees do not consider the exercise of the power to be for the benefit of the beneficiary; 136 secondly, that where some of the trusts purported to be created by the exercise of the power are void for perpetuity, this raises the question of whether the trustees consider the remaining, putatively valid, trusts to be beneficial; thirdly, that in Re Hastings-Bass there is no doubt that either the trustees did consider the modified exercise of the power 137 to be for the beneficiary's benefit, or that if they did not consider it they could not, had they considered it, reasonably have reached any other conclusion. All the discussion of whether the trustees would have so acted had they known the true legal consequences of the exercise of the power (ie had they appreciated the effect of the rule against perpetuities
138
) is directed to the section 32 issue, because it goes to whether the 'benefit' requirement is satisfied. If it is not, the trustees' actions are not within the section 32 power.
139
Re Abrahams' WT 140 is very similar. In Re HastingsBass it was not viewed as authority for anything other than the consequences for the section 32 issue of the rule against perpetuity causing the effects of the exercise of the power to have been so drastically altered that:
the trustees cannot reasonably be supposed to have addressed their minds to the questions relevant to the true effect of the transaction. The effect of the perpetuity problem was 'wholly to alter the character of the settlement' 142 and the modified advancement was simply not beneficial to the supposed beneficiaries, and so was not within the section 32 power.
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Green v Cobham
Even without the support of Re Hastings-Bass 144 and
Re Abrahams' WT, 145 there is some apparently significant support in the case law for the 'strong' Re Hastings-Bass rule. The first such case is Green v Cobham 146 in which the claimant trustees sought a declaration that their exercise of a power to appoint funds to the testator's granddaughter, Camilla, on accumulation and maintenance trusts was void, on the basis that the appointment gave rise to an entirely unforeseen liability to capital gains tax, that the trustees would not have exercised the power had they appreciated the tax consequences of doing so, and that in these circumstances the Re Hastings-Bass rule applied to render void the purported exercise of the power. 147 Parker J concluded that this was a case where capital gains tax was not considered at all, rather than one where the trustees received incorrect advice 148 and noted that:
everyone concerned proceeded throughout on the footing that the two accumulation and maintenance settlements would fall to be treated as separate settlements for capital gains tax purposes . . .
149
That in fact the two settlements in issue would be treated as a single settlement for tax purposes was the cause of the unforeseen tax liability. 150 However, on the evidence before the court it appears in substance more likely that capital gains tax was a matter always under consideration, but that the trustees simply failed to appreciate the legal possibility of Camilla's appointment having capital gains tax consequences for the fund. 151 So in substance there was no failure to consider capital gains tax at all, but rather a mere failure to appreciate the legal consequences of the appointment from a capital gains tax perspective. Counsel for the trustees made the then novel claim that the rule in Re Hastings-Bass applied to cases where the trustees failed to understand the legal consequences of their actions, even though they understood what they were doing. To bring this argument within the 'weak' rule would require saying that the trustees were required to take into account, in deciding whether to appoint, the true capital gains tax consequences consequences of making the appointment. This would collapse the supposed 'weak' rule into the 'strong' rule, since it would invalidate the transaction on the basis that its outcome was not what the trustees intended. Hence Green v Cobham looks at first glance very much like a 'strong rule' case. There are serious difficulties, however, with that view. As well as the usual problem in these cases of there being no party opposed to the relief sought to mount a real argument against it, 152 the reasoning of the judgment proceeded on the foundation of an unwise concession by counsel, that:
before executing the 1990 deed the trustees of the will trust ought to have taken into account the possible capital gains tax consequences of the contemplated appointment for the benefit of Camilla. 
Articles
Once it is accepted that the trustees had a duty to take into account the capital gains tax consequences of the appointment and that they did not, then the case is all but concluded, without proper argument on the crucial issue. The case was then argued on the issue of whether it could be shown that the trustees would have acted differently had they taken the tax consequences into account.
154 But this argument was surely doomed to failure, since it was virtually certain that the trustees would have acted differently. No trustee would knowingly incur such a tax liability where it is avoidable. The real counter-argument would of course have been that the Re Hastings-Bass rule did not bite on these facts, because it had not been shown that the trustees had failed to take into account a relevant consideration, judging 'relevant consideration' by the standard of the 'weak' rule. But this was not put to the court. Of course, if Parker J's doubtful finding of fact, that the trustees totally failed to consider the possibility of capital gains tax, 155 is accepted, then
Green can be explained simply as a 'weak' rule case. A responsible trustee might be unaware of some of the subtleties of tax law 156 but even the least capable and diligent would surely appreciate that the exercise of a power to transfer assets out of the trust fund might give rise to tax consequences, and that such consequences should be ascertained and considered in the decision-making process. Thus, the failure to consider even the possibility of capital gains tax issues would be a breach of trust which would invalidate the appointment on a purely 'weak' rule basis.
AbacusTrust Company (Isle of Man) Ltd v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Eighteen months after Parker J's decision in Green it fell to Patten J to apply that decision in the context of a Re Hastings-Bass claim by trustees who exercised a power of appointment during the 1997-98 fiscal year, after receiving clear and correct legal advice that under no circumstances should they make the appointment until the 1998-99 fiscal year had begun. The consequence of this failure was a capital gains tax liability of £1.2 million. 157 Patten J held that the trustees had failed to take into account the fiscal consequences of making the appointment before the new fiscal year began 158 and that Green v Cobham is authority that when trustees decide to exercise a power, they must have regard to the fiscal consequences of the exercise. If they do not, and would not have made the appointment if they had, the purported exercise of the power is void. 159 This simply does not work as a 'weak' rule case. The trustees acted responsibly and properly, in that when they executed the deed of appointment on 3rd April 1998, they did so in reliance on their solicitor's advice to execute the deed of appointment then. This advice was erroneous but the trustees acted on it believing that they were doing what was necessary to make the tax saving scheme work. They undoubtedly took fiscal matters into account in making their decision, and there was no flaw in the decision-making process. On the 'weak' rule, the appointment should be unimpeachable. Yet the trustees' Re Hastings-Bass claim succeeded, and the appointment was held to be invalid. The 'strong' rule explains the outcome simply. The trustees acted on the basis that they were engaged in successful tax mitigation, whereas the true consequence of the trustees' decision to execute the deed of appointment on 3rd April was to bring about a liability to capital gains tax of £1.2 million. 161 On the 'strong' rule approach, the appointment should be invalid, as Patten J found it to be. It may therefore be that that to support the 'weak' rule requires this case to be treated as wrongly decided. But it is possible to make some criticisms of the case as authority. 166 This inevitably leads to the conclusion in the case, without mandating the 'weak' or 'strong' view, since neither approach necessarily requires every factually relevant issue to be taken into account. By overlooking the need for reasoned analysis of what the trustees are obliged to take into account, Patten J renders the outcome a foregone conclusion. Thirdly, this is a troubling case because it simply does not look like a typical Re Hastings-Bass case. The trustees had considered the tax issue, and the attendant legal issues, in some detail, with the benefit of advice from eminent counsel. 167 To some degree therefore the trustees had considered all relevant matters and formed an entirely proper conclusion-that they should not make the appointment to the NSPCC before 6th April 1998. Yet they went ahead with it anyway. So there is no factual matter which they ought to have considered but did not, to invoke the weak rule, nor did their action produced an unintended, or even unanticipated, outcome, to invoke the strong rule. Rather this looks more like either a straightforward mistake, based on having forgotten what they had previously known (as was the case in Lady Hood of Avalon v Mackinnon
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) or a Turner v Turner case of executing the deed simply on the instructions of another (in this case the solicitor, Mr Jenkins) without giving independent consideration to what they were doing. 169 Either could potentially justifying setting aside the appointment, 170 so the outcome may not necessarily be in doubt. But it makes it difficult to argue that Abacus Trust Co v NSPCC is necessarily authority for the strong approach, when that approach so ill fits the circumstances of the case.
Burrell v Burrell
In Burrell v Burrell 171 shares in a family company, MBE, were held on accumulation and maintenance trusts for Dennis Burrell's son, Charles. Concerned that Charles would receive too much wealth on his 18th birthday, the trustees (of which Dennis was one) took legal advice on the possibility of exercising an overriding power of appointment to settle the fund on discretionary trusts until Charles was 35 (at which time he had to become absolutely entitled under the terms of the original trust Lloyd LJ carried out an extensive review of the case law, much of which was not strictly necessary for his decision in Sieff itself. He noted that the Re HastingsBass formulation based on:
whether the trustees took into account matters which they ought not to have done, or failed to take into account matters which they ought to have . . . respects the traditional view, that it is for the trustees to exercise the power, and to decide whether or not to do so. 200 However, in spite of this apparent nod to the weak formulation of the rule, he went on to hold that trustees must, in exercising a power, take into account the true fiscal consequences of their action.
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Acknowledging that the trustees 'did in fact consider' 202 207 he also emphasized the requirement that when the trustee exercises a power 'the effect of the exercise is different from that which he intended'. 208 On the 'weak' approach this would simply be irrelevant. This added requirement of an unintended effect was not decisive in Sieff, since there was no doubt that what the trustees achieved-a huge capital gains tax liability-was unintended. But it provides additional support for the view that Sieff is firmly grounded in the strong approach. As a matter of authority, Sieff v Fox is a significant stumbling block for the argument for the 'weak' approach. After very full argument and lengthy consideration, a judge of some nine years' experience on the bench of the Chancery division of the High Court, and recently elevated to the Court of Appeal, drew conclusions which provide powerful support for the 'strong' rule and which cannot stand with the 'weak' rule approach. However, with the greatest of respect for the detailed consideration given to the many issues arising in this case by Lloyd LJ, it is possible to criticise the approach he took to the two issues crucial to the use of Sieff to reject the 'weak' approach, being the relevance of fiscal consequences and failure to consider them, and the need for the trustees to have brought about a result different from what they intended.
First, in relation to the obligation of the trustees to take into account the true fiscal consequences of their decision, there is no doubt that Lloyd LJ decides that they are so obliged. 209 However, the only reason given for this is that 'trustees do have regard to the fiscal treatment of the trust property'. 210 This is undoubtedly true, and it is undoubtedly proper that trustees should do this, and that in cases where tax matters arise, the trustees should be obliged to do this. But as Lloyd LJ himself notes
It does not follow that they need to know every detail of the tax consequences of acting as they propose 211 In essence, Lloyd LJ tries to chart a very difficult course, by arguing that whilst trustees are in general obliged to take into account the true fiscal consequences of their actions, they might not be obliged fully to take account of tax matters where they are 'too subtle and arcane' 212 for it to be reasonable to expect that of the trustees. If this means that trustees' decisions can be impugned for failure to consider 'simple' tax matters, but not 'complex' ones, then it is not only unprincipled, but impossible to give meaningful effect to in practice, since trustees are likely to take expert advice on tax matters and to rely on such advice, as they did in Sieff. Except perhaps in a truly exceptional case where the advice given to the trustees was patently incorrect, it is very difficult to see how a distinction between 'simple' and 'complex' tax matters could be relevant. If the judge meant simply that trustees must act responsibly in regard to tax matters, but do not necessarily have to get it right (albeit that getting it wrong in a simple case might suggest that the trustees acted irresponsibly) then he is in accordance with the 'weak' approach, and should have decided this case differently. did not include it in his formulation of the Re Hastings-Bass rule, and that none of the cases after Mettoy until Sieff 219 reintroduced it, it must be questionable whether it was legitimate for Lloyd LJ to assert a requirement of unintended consequences. As such, it might be though that the analysis in Sieff v Fox is less compelling that it might at first glance appear, and accordingly that less weight should be accorded to it as authority for the 'strong' approach. 
Consequences of adopting the 'weak' rule
In the light of the limitations of these cases which purportedly support the 'strong' approach, the 'weak' model of the Re Hastings-Bass rule should now be considered to be the correct one. Not only is it consistent with most of the Re Hastings-Bass case law (including some of the cases which at first sight appear to support the 'strong rule' 220 ), but it is also consistent with important principles of trust law of much greater longevity, exemplified in McPhail v Doulton 221 and Gisborne v Gisborne. 222 Sieff v Fox, 223 as important a case as it is, simply cannot bear the weight of standing alone against the many arguments which have been made for the 'weak' approach. Of course, the question which must now be answered is: so what? If the 'weak' model is the correct way of understanding the Hastings-Bass rule, then what does this tell us about how the rule should function? Considerations of space prevent any detailed consideration of these issues here, but some tentative suggestions may be made. First, that the question of what counts as a 'relevant consideration' should be answered by reference to the concept of responsible trusteeship which is core to the 'weak' approach. Likewise the issue of whether pension trusts should be treated in the same manner as private trusts generally-they should be, but the obligations of responsible trusteeship may be more onerous where the beneficiaries are not volunteers. 224 Secondly, once it is understood that the function of the rule is to protect the beneficiaries' entitlement to proper performance by trustees of their duty to consider, then it would seem more appropriate to require the beneficiaries to establish merely that, had the trustees considered all the matters that a responsible trustee would have considered, they might have acted differently, not that they would have done so. A 'would have acted differently' requirement would impose an artificial limitation on the beneficiaries' right to proper administration of the trust.
Thirdly, the question of whether the effect of the rule is to render the purported exercise of a power void or voidable remains open. The cases and voluminous literature have canvassed the many reasons to prefer one to the other. Nolan has demonstrated that breach of trust generally renders the exercise of a power voidable, not void, but also that this is not always the case. 225 The author's present view is that whilst a correct understanding of the nature and scope of the rule should inform this debate, nudging it firmly in the direction of 'voidable', it will not conclude it; there will always be competing arguments of policy and doctrine. Ultimately, any decision on this issue may need to be pragmatic as much as principled.
